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Abstract  
 
This paper examines how and why the institutional framework governing EMU has 
evolved since the creation of the euro. Building on theories of institutionalism, the paper 
in particular investigates to what extent functional spill-overs from the single currency to 
other policy domains, like macroeconomic policies or financial regulation, met with an 
adequate institutional response, and to what extent the existing institutional framework 
conditioned the response to the financial crisis. The interaction between policy 
requirements and institutional capabilities is examined both in “ordinary” times (1999-
2007) and under “crisis conditions” (2007-2010). The paper uses a typology of change 
which helps to put into perspective both the resilience of the institutional framework of 
EMU and its capacity to adapt. In this respect, it allows for a better understanding and 
framing of the current reforms of EMU economic governance. It concludes that even 
though the crisis will accelerate institutional development, it will do so only in a gradual 
way, as path dependence and inbuilt bias towards incremental change will prevent policy-
makers pursuing a “clean slate” strategy.  
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Non-technical summary 
 
This paper investigates the institutional dynamics of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
since its inception in 1999. The analysis rests on the premise that “institutions matter”, for 
institutions played a key role in generating distinctive policy outcomes and thus help to 
better understand the current strengths and shortcomings of the EMU framework.  
 
The paper aims to explore the following questions: 
 Did the increased economic and “political” (in the sense of carrying out policies)  
interconnectedness among euro area countries deriving from the shared use of the 
single currency meet with an adequate institutional response in terms of common 
economic governance structures?  
 What types of institutional change did we observe during the first decade of EMU?  
 To what extent did the existing institutional set-up condition the crisis response at 
EU/euro area level? In particular, did it succeed in mediating and shaping national 
interests to the benefit of the common interest of the EU and the euro area as a whole?  
 What lessons can be drawn from the crisis that severely stress-tested EMU? Will 
the EMU institutional set-up change significantly and shift to a new development 
path as a result of this experience? 
 
While mainstream political economy approaches to EMU consider mainly new modes of 
governance (e.g. “soft” coordination, informal governance), the present paper tackles 
these questions by applying state-of-the-art institutionalist theories to understand the role 
of institutions in generating the distinctive trajectory of EMU. In addition, it resorts to a 
typology of institutional change as developed by Thelen and Streeck (2005) to capture the 
types of institutional change that EMU has undergone.  
 
The institutional dynamics of EMU, and in particular the interaction between policy 
requirements and institutional capabilities, is examined both in “ordinary” times (1999-
2007) and under “crisis conditions” (2007-2010). As regards the first period, the paper 
analyses the incremental nature of the changes which the EMU framework has undergone 
using the concepts of layering and redirection, while at the same time aiming to capture in 
what way these changes were insufficient to effectively cope with the new quality of 
economic interconnectedness across Member States. In line with the predictions of 
institutionalism, the paper shows that institutional choices made in Maastricht have largely 
determined the path of the institutional evolution of EMU over the first eight years. Some 
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institutional features of the Maastricht blueprint, especially the way common rules were 
applied and enforced, proved ex post not to be fully adapted to the functioning of a monetary 
union. However, these deficiencies did not come to the fore during the first eight years of 
EMU, not least given the favourable economic conditions. 
 
In “crisis times” (August 2007- September 2010), the paper focuses more specifically on the 
respective role of Union institutions and Member States’ interests in shaping the crisis 
response. The assumptions of institutionalism are once again verified: Union institutions did 
play a significant role in remedying the ‘collective action dilemma’ and in shaping Member 
States’ behaviours during the first part (2007-2009) of the financial crisis. By contrast, the 
sovereign debt crisis which erupted in 2010 exemplified how an institutional framework 
based on decentralised policy-making, soft coordination and weak enforcement of common 
rules can be insufficient to effectively manage the interplay between competing domestic 
interests under severe market stresses. 
 
Finally, the paper concludes that, even though the crisis will accelerate the institutional 
development of EMU (as witnessed by the creation of the ESRB/ESFS and EFSM/EFSF), it 
will do so in a gradual way, as path dependence and inbuilt bias towards incremental change 
will prevent policy-makers pursuing a “clean slate” strategy. 
 
Preliminary draft – Please do not quote 
 
 
Page 4 of 40 
I. Introduction  
 
“The 10th Anniversary of the euro is an opportunity (…) to celebrate an impressive and historic achievement” 
(Bernanke 2008: 282) 
 
“The more the crisis in the euro area develops, the more the last ten years seem to have been an artificial paradise” 
(Pisani-Ferry 2010)2 
 
Looking back at the first twelve years of EMU, the assessments by scholars and policy-
makers of the performance of EMU has undergone remarkable shifts. Starting from the 
uncertainty surrounding its launch, the general assessment of EMU went through a period 
of praise, which was followed again by widespread uncertainty due to the current crisis 
(Buti and Gaspar 2008).  
 
Prior to the launch of the euro, EMU was seen as a “high-stakes experiment” (Hodson 
2010), where “success could not be taken for granted” (Buti and Gaspar 2008). Initial 
scepticism was particularly deep outside Europe. Many American scholars expressed 
strong doubts about the virtues of monetary integration in Europe, its economic feasibility 
and political viability. The possibility of a euro-area break-up has been debated in the US 
from the very beginning of EMU (e.g. Feldstein 1997; Tobin 1998). At the origin of this 
scepticism was – among other things – the fundamental asymmetry on which the EMU 
institutional set-up was based. Unlike in the previous attempt to establish Economic and 
Monetary Union in Europe – the 1970 Werner plan – which foresaw, in addition to a 
federal central bank, a “centre of decision-making for economic policy” (Werner Report 
1970: 12-133), the Maastricht Treaty embodied a conscious and fundamental political 
choice not to create a fully-fledged economic union: with the creation of the euro in 1999, 
monetary and exchange rate policies were transferred to the euro area level, while 
economic policies (such as fiscal or structural policies) largely remained within the remit 
of Member States and became subject to coordination procedures. This was mainly due to 
the fact that national governments saw these policies as the remaining core of national 
sovereignty, and had a profound interest in maintaining a substantive involvement. The 
asymmetry of the institutional set-up was also justified both on economic and 
constitutional grounds. At the time, the argument rested on the application of the 
                                                          
2 See foreword of Proissl, W. (2010), “Why Germany fell out of love with Europe”, Bruegel Essay and 
Lecture Series 
3 This centre of decision-making for economic policy was supposed to “exercise independently, in accordance 
with the Community interest, a decisive influence over the general economic policy of the Community. In 
view of the fact that the role of the Community budget as an economic instrument will be insufficient, the 
Community’s centre of decision must be in a position to influence the national budgets”. Several ideas voiced 
in the Van Rompuy Task Force on an independent agency which would oversee national budget echo the ideas 
raised forty years earlier in the Werner Report.  
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subsidiarity principle reflecting the economic rationale that the allocation of policy 
responsibilities to a higher, supranational level would only be justified if the Member States 
cannot achieve the set objectives by themselves, or if the Union for reasons of scale or 
effects is better placed to achieve them. In EMU, that meant that monetary policy, by nature 
of its singleness and indivisibility, could not suitably remain decentralised, and hence has 
been unified and handed to a supranational central bank, the ECB/Eurosystem. The same 
logic applied to the regulatory framework of the Single Market, since a common market 
requires a set of common rules together with credible enforcement or at least a joint 
agreement on the mutual recognition of national norms and standards. By contrast, fiscal 
policies, microeconomic, structural and prudential supervisory policies, as well as labour 
market and employment policies were left in the hands of national policy-makers, “since 
there [were] – for the time being – no compelling arguments that could justify a full transfer 
of these policy responsibilities to the [Union] level.” (emphasis added, ECB 2001). Policy 
decentralisation was seen as providing national authorities with flexibility and vital room for 
manoeuvre while preventing negative externalities through implicit coordination via deficit 
and debt ceilings. In addition, it offered scope for the beneficial effects of healthy policy 
competition and for the emergence of best practices that could be emulated. 
 
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the euro, both academics and policy-makers 
conducted numerous stock-taking exercises. The overall evaluation of EMU after its first 
decade was largely positive. Even outside the euro area, the euro was described as 
“spectacular” (Bergsten 2005: 28) and an “indisputable success” (Posen 2009: 85). 
However, some warned that the euro was a “fair-weather currency”, the true test of which 
was yet to come (see Dominguez 2006). 
 
Interestingly, this general praise continued during the first stage of the crisis (2007 until 
late 2009), where the euro was often described as a shield which protected the 16 euro 
area countries from speculation and currency crisis – as had happened in the early 1990s. 
Till late 2009, many observers concluded that EMU had passed the test of the global 
financial crisis (Jaillet and Pisani-Ferry 2010). Within only a few months, the general 
perception moved from “where would we be without the euro?” (Martens and Zuleeg 
2008) to “will EMU survive?”. With the advent of the sovereign debt crisis in early 2010, 
the break-up debate intensified, and many arguments that were made in the context of the 
feasibility debate surrounding the launch of EMU were again brought to the forefront, 
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with the voices of the “We-told-you-this-will-never-work” faction of the commentary 
gaining important ground in the argument 4. 
 
Critical voices in the first eight years of EMU had mainly focused on the comparably 
overall mediocre economic performance of the euro area, while rarely commenting on the 
economic policy framework. During the crisis, by contrast, and especially with the onset 
of the sovereign debt crisis, concerns of observers moved beyond economics, to also touch 
upon the institutional and political capacity of the euro area governance framework to 
deal with the crisis and its implications. This sudden focus on, and acute awareness of 
perceived insufficiencies of, the institutional setting during the crisis is best exemplified 
by the significant attention that the debate on economic governance has attracted, and 
continues to attract.5 
 
In fact, the trajectory of EMU had neither been dictated by market forces nor been the 
fruit of mere coincidence. This paper argues that institutions played a key role in 
generating distinctive policy outcomes. Based on the premise that “institutions matter”, a 
review of the first twelve years of EMU from an institutionalist perspective can help to 
better explain how the institutional framework governing EMU has developed since the 
creation of the euro and identify the reasons behind the relative inertia and gradualism of 
its evolution. This paper explores the dynamics of this evolution and the role of 
institutions, with recourse to new institutionalist theories as a conceptual background. 
Hereby, “institutions” are defined in a very broad sense and encompass formal and 
informal procedures, rules, interaction, etc. For the purposes of the analysis, it is 
opportune to distinguish between the performance of the EMU institutional framework in 
“ordinary” or “fair-weather” times (1999-2007) as well as under “crisis conditions” 
(August 2007- September 2010). The analysis covers the period until September 2010 
(publication of Commission proposals for economic governance). While a number of 
momentous economic and institutional developments have happened since then, a certain 
cut-off date needs to be defined in order to maintain a clear focus of the analysis. 
References to specific developments since that cut-off date are included where this adds 
value to the arguments presented. 
                                                          
4 See for example S. Brittan, 2010 “The futile effort to save the eurozone”, Financial Times, 4 November (“If 
something is unsustainable, it will not be sustained”) or Christopher Smallwood, 2010 “Why the euro zone 
needs to break up”, Capital Economics (“For the sake of the future economic health and success of the 
European Union, the euro-zone needs to break up.”),  
5 The Van Rompuy Task Force (VRTF) was set up in March 2010 and delivered its report on 21 October 
2010. The European Central Bank came up with proposals in June 2010, and the Commission published six 
legislative proposals on 29 September 2010.  
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With regard to the “fair-weather” period (1999-2007), the possibly extraordinary period of 
low macroeconomic volatility in the early years of the euro, we aim to explore the 
following questions: 
 Did the increased policy interconnectedness deriving from the shared use of the 
single currency meet with an adequate institutional response on the part of the 
institutions of economic governance?  
 What types of institutional change did we observe?  
 To what extent did previous institutional choices determine the path of the 
institutional evolution?  
 How to explain this distinctive trajectory? 
 
The crisis period since 2007 put severe pressure on the operation of the institutional 
framework, motivating a different set of questions, namely:  
 To what extent did the existing institutional set-up condition the crisis response at 
EU/euro area level?  
 In particular, did it succeed in mediating and shaping national interests to the benefit 
of the common interest of the EU and the euro area as a whole?  
 What lessons can be drawn from the crisis that severely stress-tested EMU?  
 Will the EMU institutional set-up undergo a more dramatic change and shift to a new 
development path as a result of this experience? 
 
In seeking to answer these questions, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays 
down the conceptual framework applied throughout the paper and explains its relevance. 
Section 3 explores the evolution of the EMU framework in “ordinary times” (1999-2007), 
while Section 4 analyses the reaction of EMU to the crisis during “extraordinary times” 
(2007-2010). Section 5 attempts to draw some lessons from the first twelve years of 
existence of EMU and discusses the likely evolution of the EMU institutional framework 
in the aftermath of the crisis.  
 
2. Why institutions matter: explaining the evolution of EMU through 
the institutionalist lense 
Since the inception of the Euro, the institutional architecture of EMU displayed both 
continuity and change. How can we account for the changes observed and their impact on 
Preliminary draft – Please do not quote 
 
 
Page 8 of 40 
the economic governance of the EMU? Classical economics alone cannot fully explain 
them. Even if economic reasons were the trigger of change, they alone cannot account for 
the particular form of institutional change that occurred. Why did some institutions fare 
better than others in the EMU framework? Why did new institutions emerge while others 
became marginalised? North and Weingast (1989) gave an important example of how 
institutions impact the economy with their study of the Glorious Revolution, thereby 
complementing and expanding a perspective based purely on the uncritical acceptance of 
neoclassical economics. For “neoclassical theory is concerned with the allocation of 
resources at a moment of time, a devastatingly limiting feature to historians whose central 
question is to account for change over time. Moreover, the allocation was assumed to 
occur in a frictionless world, that is, one in which institutions either did not exist or did 
not matter” (North 1990: 131). 
 
On the other hand, mainstream political economy approaches to EMU have also been 
partial, and have not really undertaken a comprehensive examination of the whole 
institutional set-up6. They have proved to be static and have neither captured nor 
explained institutional change or lack thereof. 7 This is what this paper aims to achieve 
with the analytical tools provided by the new institutionalist approach.  
 
2.1. The relevance of the new institutionalist approach 
In political science, this new theoretical approach emerged in the 1980s partly in reaction 
against behavioural perspectives. Its main assertion is that institutions do matter in 
determining decisional outcomes (Nugent 2006: 572). An institutionalist perspective can 
help to better understand both the resilience and the degree of adaptability of the EMU 
institutional architecture. It looks at the institutional organisation of the polity or political 
economy as the main factor structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive 
outcomes (Hall and Taylor: 937). It can measure “big structures, large processes and 
[make] huge comparisons” (Tilly 1984)8, based on the key assumption that institutional 
development is dominated by path dependency.  
 
“Once actors have ventured far down a particular path, they are likely to find it very 
difficult to revert course. The path not taken or the political alternatives that were 
once quite plausible may become irreversibly lost. “Path dependence analysis” 
highlights the role of “historical causation” in which dynamics triggered by an event 
                                                          
6 For an early critique of the governance approach, see Dyson (2000: 106-108).  
7 For a balanced and nuanced account of the strength and weaknesses of the principal-agent approach as 
applied to EMU governance, see Hodson (2009b).  
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or a process at one point in time reproduce themselves, even in the absence of the 
recurrence of the original event or process.” (Pierson & Skocpol 2002)  
The institutionalist approach can offer useful insights to elucidate the institutional 
trajectory of EMU from 1999 to 2007. 
 
Institutionalism 9 is also “fit for purpose” to explore the policy response to the crisis (2007-
2010),as another strand of research of new institutionalism investigates the extent to which 
and the ways in which institutions shape, channel and constrain the rational choices of 
political actors (Nugent 2006: 573). Applied to the process of European integration, this 
approach can explain the motivations of national governments to engage further in the 
process of European unification despite the implied loss of competences, and to demonstrate 
the consequences of different EU decision-making rules for political actors’ behaviour 
(Nugent 2006: 573). It is based on three main assumptions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 944-945). 
First of all, as in the microeconomic rational choice theory, the relevant actors have a fixed 
set of preferences and behave rationally so as to maximize their utility. Second, politics is a 
series of collective action dilemmas: with each political actor acting to maximize the 
attainment of its own preferences, the outcome is likely to be collectively suboptimal. Third, 
institutional arrangements can serve as a remedy to this problem by influencing actors’ 
behaviours. In particular, they can shape the actors’ expectations about how others are likely 
to behave and thereby shape their strategic calculations. 
 
The crisis has led to a multiplication of ‘collective action dilemmas’ in EMU, because a 
more robust pursuit of the national interest usually comes to the fore in crisis times. This 
is because “in difficult economic times the comfortable illusion [that the economy works 
with sufficient regularity] disintegrates, […] economic models come into conflict, and 
policy prescriptions diverge.” (Gourevitch, 1986) 10 By looking at the “crisis times” 
through the lenses of institutionalism, the paper will seek to explain patterns of policy 
response and the resulting outcomes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
8 Big structures, large processes and huge comparisons, Tilly, 1984 
9 As explained by Hall and Taylor (1996), rational choice institutionalism originated in the observation of a 
paradox in the political behaviour of the US Congress. The traditional rational choices’ approach would lead to 
the conclusion that it is virtually impossible to secure stable majorities for passing legislation in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. However, Congressional outcomes actually show considerable stability. To 
explain this paradox, rational choice institutionalists turned their attention to institutions and demonstrated how 
the rules of Congress affect the behaviour of legislators, reduce the transaction costs and solve many of the 
collective action problems with which a parliament is usually confronted. 
10 For a historical overview of politics during economic crises, see Gourevitch (1986). 
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2.2. A typology of institutional change applied to EMU  
Institutions can be viewed as comparable to biological bodies that are “not perfectly 
designed organisms” but are constantly adapting and evolving, thus producing variation, 
incremental changes or ruptures at critical junctures (Steinmo and Lewis 2007). Precisely 
because “institutions matter” - in particular their relative inertia or adaptation - in explaining 
the evolution of EMU, it is useful to develop a more detailed typology of institutional 
change to better describe the developments observed over the past decade. The paper will 
thus draw on the following typology developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005): 
 layering is an institutional change which happens when new institutional elements are 
added to existing ones. Applied to the EMU context, this process can be seen in the 
successive addition of institutions (such as the EFSM/EFSF or the “codification” of the 
Eurogroup in the Lisbon Treaty), processes (creation of Lisbon agenda and related 
process) and policy instruments (Art. 136 TFEU decision addressed to Greece). 
 displacement takes place when an element of the institutional setup gains more 
salience over time. The ECB provides an interesting instance of “displacement”: the 
ECB’s role has been more and more prominent since the eruption of the crisis, first 
with measures on the financial markets in August 2007, then with the Securities 
Market Programme (SMP) to ensure a proper transmission of monetary policy during 
the sovereign debt crisis and a strong voice in the debate on governance reform.  
 redirection occurs when an institution has its parameters changed and its objectives 
reoriented, be it in a fundamental way or in a marginal manner. A example of such a 
change is the Stability and Growth Pact which has gone beyond being a mere 
disciplinarian device (limiting borrowing of Member States to ensure the sustainability 
of EMU and to prevent harmful spill-over between Member States and between fiscal 
and monetary policy) to a more wide-ranging instrument to steer broader aspects of 
budgetary policy (increasing its focus on the long-term sustainability of public finance 
and pensions, as well as on the quality of public finances and domestic institutional 
frameworks like rules or medium-term frameworks).  
 drift happens when institutional setups are overwhelmed by external developments. Such 
a case can be found in the discrepancy between financial integration which proceeded 
apace and the elaboration of a financial supervision, which remained fragmented.  
 depletion can be identified when institutions experience a gradual breakdown over 
time. Obviously, this variety of gradual change hardly applies to EMU since it is still 
a relatively young “institution”.  
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This typology of institutional change needs to be complemented by a review of the drivers 
of institutional change. While the mainstream literature usually focuses exclusively on 
path dependency, overstating permanence and then being unable to explain change, 
Lindner (2003) aptly reverses the arguments by asking what produces institutional 
stability. He argues that the analysis of institutional stability provides the key for 
explaining the emergence of institutional change. He identifies four ‘reproduction 
mechanisms’: the bargaining power of the anti-change coalition; the interdependence 
between policy sub-fields; the costs of switching to another institutional setting; the ability 
to accommodate pressure for change through minor adaptations. Institutional change 
comes about only when these reproduction mechanisms break down.  
 
Table 1. Varieties of gradual change11 
 Layering Displacement Redirection Drift Depletion 
Definition 
New elements 
added to 
existing 
frameworks 
change slowly 
their structure 
Some 
institutions gain 
more salience 
overtime 
Old institutions 
get new 
objectives on top 
of their old ones 
Institutions 
adapt 
insufficiently to 
external change 
Institutions 
wither away 
Drivers of 
stability/ 
change 
Pressure for change accommodated by  
small on-path changes 
Lack of actors 
interest in 
change; 
important 
switching costs 
Failure of 
reproduction 
mechanisms 
Example in 
EMU 
Eurogroup 
“codification” 
in the Lisbon 
Treaty; 
EFSF; 
ESRB; 
Extension of 
surveillance 
mechanisms 
ECB took the 
“lead” during 
the crisis as 
crisis 
“manager”: 
providing 
liquidity, SMP 
SGP and 
budgetary 
surveillance 
redirected 
towards 
sustainability 
and set to take 
into account 
imbalances 
Financial 
supervision: 
Lamfalussy 
process. 
Competitivenes
s framework 
 
None 
 
 
3. Plain sailing? EMU in fair-weather times (1999-2007) 
 
This section identifies and examines through the lenses of institutionalism the varieties of 
institutional change of EMU’s framework in “fair-weather times”. EMU institutional 
dynamics during the first decade can be subsumed into two groups: the first one, which 
reflects the concept of spill-over effects through layering and redirection, represents the slow 
and incremental adaptation of the institutional architecture of EMU to internal and external 
pressures, like the SGP crisis of 2003-2005. The second one, embodied by the logic of 
resistance and path dependence, shows how institutions faced difficulties to adapt because of 
the long-lasting and locked-in effects of the institutional choices made in Maastricht. We 
analyse both groups in turn in this section in the light of the first decade of EMU.  
                                                          
11 Adapted from Streeck and Thelen (2005: 31).  
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3.1 How the EMU institutional architecture adapted incrementally: layering and redirection 
Since the Maastricht Treaty, EMU institutional architecture evolved mainly by the process of 
layering and redirection, because of institutional frictions and spill-over effects stemming 
from the asymmetric structure of EMU. This resulted into continued efforts over time to put 
more flesh on the “E” of “EMU” even before EMU came to reality. In the words of the Delors 
report, this is because “Economic and Monetary Union form two integral parts of a single 
whole and would therefore have to be implemented in parallel”12. 
 
A first step was taken to reinforce economic governance with the creation of the SGP which 
was signed in 1997. It was designed to build on and clarify a framework for sound budgetary 
policies and to avoid free riding. It was also useful to clarify the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
of Article 126 of the TFEU. On top of that came the Eurogroup which provides an informal 
forum for Finance Ministers from the euro area (see Puetter 2006).  
 
Simultaneous steps were taken to reinforce the coordination of structural economic reforms on 
the supply side. Yet, while the SGP was mainly based on “hard coordination” through “hard 
law”, structural coordination was “soft” because it relied on a new institutional layer dubbed 
the “Open Method of Coordination” (OMC). Contrary to the traditional Union method which 
relies on the Commission as agenda-setter, voting by the Council and the European Parliament 
and the interpretation of law by the European Court of Justice, the OMC is a “heterarchical, 
decentered and dynamic process [which] supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity” 
(Hodson and Maher 2001: 719). The coordination of structural reforms is important because of 
potential spill-overs that can happen between these policy areas and the fiscal and monetary 
domains. Thus economic spill-overs can become political spill-overs in the form of new 
institutional processes. The coordination of these reforms was supposed to be achieved 
through processes like those of Luxembourg (1997 – labour market reforms), Cardiff (1998 – 
product and capital market reforms) and Cologne (1999 – macroeconomic dialogue involving 
social partners). These processes were streamlined in the Lisbon strategy of 2000 which set 
goals for the creation “of the most competitive economy in the world” by 2010. This process 
was reformed in 2005 and further refined in 2010 with the EU 2020 economic strategy.  
 
                                                          
12 Delors Report, 1989: paragraph 21. 
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Chart 1. Institutions & bodies in EU/euro area economic governance 
 
 
ECOFIN Council 
European Council
European Central Bank 
Economic and Financial Committee
European Parliament 
Eurogroup Working Group 
European Commission Economic Policy Committee
Financial Services Committee
Financial Crisis Cell
European Financial 
Stability Facility 
European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism
Predating EMU or part of the original Maastricht design for EMU 
Created in response to specific demands of euro area Member States  
Created in the course of 1999-2009 
Created in response to the sovereign debt crisis 
Euro area Heads 
of State or 
Government 
 
 
This process of institutional layering of economic governance came on top of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs). The BEPGs exist as such since 1993 but have a pre-
history which goes back to the Treaty of Rome when the Monetary Committee started to 
publish country recommendations in 1959 (see Deroose, Hodson and Kulhmann 2008). The 
BEPGs also represent a form of path dependency: the creation of a Medium-Term Economic 
Policy Committee in 1964 issued guidelines which were also later the main instrument to 
coordinate economic policies in order to implement the EMU (article 99.2 of the Maastricht 
Treaty). In fact, the first BEPG of 1993 were the core of a nascent multilateral surveillance, a 
framework to assess Member States’ convergence programmes to EMU and a way for the 
Member States to commit to EU economic policy objectives. BEPGs were subsequently used 
in the Lisbon process. One can thus conclude that “looking back, it is clear that the first 
BEPGs articulated the essential features of EU’s economic policy strategy over the next 
decade” (Deroose, Hodson and Kuhlmann 2008: 830) because they foreshadowed the 
provisions of the SGP and the objective of price stability.  
 
The description of institutional change of EMU economic governance framework would 
be incomplete without looking at the diverse processes of policy learning, policy transfer 
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and institutional transplants which complete the layering process of the governance 
framework of EMU at the domestic level. A key process which is taking place concerns 
the reform of national fiscal frameworks which internalizes the necessities of participating 
in EMU at the domestic level. A key policy learning process and institutional transplant is 
to be identified in the case of debt rules and the constitutionalisation of budgetary balance. 
In the midst of the crisis Germany tightened the “debt brake” which limits net borrowing 
by the Federation and the Länder and which aims to bring the structural deficit to 0.35% 
of GDP by 2016 (Kastrop et alii 2009). This reformed German rule sparked a heated 
debate in France where comparable proposals were put on the table (Delpla 2010 and 
Bouzou 2010). This precise case of policy learning occurs in the broader context of the 
open method of coordination where benchmarking, consensus and exchange of policy 
experiences come to the foreground: what one witnesses is in fact the process of trial-and-
error where observations from policy successes and failures leads to consensus formation 
and policy emulation (e.g. “Danish flexicurity”13)  
 
This last example on fiscal governance provides a useful insight on institutional redirection. 
The original SGP was a disciplinary device which was supposed to prevent over-expansionary 
fiscal policies on the one hand and to co-ordinate national budgets on the other. Yet the SGP 
reform of 2005 and subsequent developments redirected its logic in two ways. First it extended 
budgetary surveillance horizontally by focusing more on the long-term perspective and on 
fiscal “sustainability”: the debt criterion becomes more important than the deficit, and more 
attention is paid to pension systems and implicit liabilities (see European Commission 2006a: 
126). Second it extended budgetary surveillance vertically by looking at the composition of 
public expenditure in Member States Budget and by fine-tuning the SGP to national 
conditions with country-specific medium-term objectives (Schelkle 2009). It also shifted from 
a mere implementation of the SGP on the supranational level to an insistance on the need to 
have strong fiscal frameworks at the national level and to increase national ownership of 
European objectives. Hence the three new agendas of budgetary surveillance which emerged 
step by step: reports on fiscal sustainability in 2006 and 2009 investigating long-term expenses 
                                                          
13 In fact, this process of policy learning is supported by the increasing importance of databases and more 
effective methodologies of surveillance (Deroose, Hodson and Kuhlmann 2008). Since 2005, EU LABREF aims at 
gathering information on labour market reforms in EU Member States (employment-protection legislation, 
unemployment and welfare related benefits, active-labour-market programmes and labour taxation). Since 2007, EU 
KLEMS gives the possibility to consult data on productivity development at the industry level for EU Member 
States since the 1970s (Koszerek et al. 2007). The LIME Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee, which 
involves Commission and National officials, works on developing methods to measure the progress of structural 
reforms. The most recent database concerns national fiscal frameworks. Established in late 2009, it provides useful 
information on fiscal rules, independent fiscal institutions and on medium budgetary frameworks in EU Member 
States. It draws on yearly questionnaires sent to national finance ministries which further specify institutional 
characteristics of their national fiscal frameworks.  
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related to pensions systems (European Commission 2009d); the focus on the “quality of public 
finance” to which a Working Group of the EPC is dedicated (Schaechter and Barrios 2008); 
and the analysis of the political economy of domestic fiscal regimes and their efficiency 
(European Commission 2006 and the subsequent yearly Public Finance Reports of the 
Commission). The results of this work show that domestic fiscal regimes have been 
strengthened over time, notably by a more extended use of fiscal rules. This last point can be 
measured by the fiscal rules index of the Fiscal Governance Database of the European 
Commission (see Chart 2). 
 
Chart 2. Evolution of domestic fiscal governance in the EU 
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Source: European Commission, Fiscal Governance Database 
 
The dynamics of financial supervision in the EU also embody well the process of layering: 
“The Lamfalussy architecture is articulated across multiple institutional levels. At level 1, 
the EP and the Council co-decide framework legislation (directives) proposed by the 
Commission. At level 2, the implementing measures (generally directives, less frequently 
regulations) of the level 1 framework legislation are adopted by the Commission through 
the comitology process, which involves the so-called level 2 committees of member states 
representatives. At level 3, the committees of national regulators (the level 3 committees) 
advise the Commission on the adoption of level 1 and level 2 measures and adopt level 3 
measures, such as non-legally binding standards and guidelines” (Quaglia 2008: 564).  
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Chart 3. The Lamfalussy supervisory committees14 
 
Finally, this process of institutional layering and expansion is also embodied by inter-
institutional relations. EMU governance went through a process of “densification” which can 
be decomposed into four trends: (1) an increased frequency of interaction; (2) a broadening of 
the topics discussed within economic fora; (3) a deepening of the discussions with an increase 
of the ECB written contributions; and (4) an increase of areas of deliberations (European 
Central Bank 2010a and graphs 4 and 5).  
 
                                                          
14 Adapted from De Haan, J., Oosterloo, S. and Schoenmaker, D., (2009), 54.  
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Chart 4. Amount of documentation processed in EU governance fora (2003-2008) 
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Chart 5. Number of meetings of economic governance fora (1999-2008) 
 
 
3.2 Accounting for the path dependency of the EMU institutional architecture 
While a gradual adaptation of the institutional framework notably in response to 
functional spill-over effects can be observed, there is also evidence of resistance, 
stickiness and path dependence of EMU architecture, or, in other words, of insufficient 
adaptation to the increased level of interconnectedness within the euro area. Institutional 
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layering reveals indeed some shortcomings in the institutional framework of EMU. The 
incremental changes were not sufficient to address the fundamental mismatch between the 
level of policy interconnectedness and the level of institutional development prevailing 
within EMU. While euro area economies have become more and more closely interlinked, 
the institutional set-up did not provide euro area Member States the right incentives, be it 
sanctions or rewards, to internalise the constraints of monetary union.  
 
Concerning fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance, institutional layering did not prove to 
be optimal as demonstrated by diverging competitiveness developments across euro area 
Member States and the poor shape of public finances in some countries. Hence, while 
institutional layering proves the institutional resilience of the framework of EMU, it also 
sheds light on one shortcoming: its insufficient capacity to adjust fast and in an optimal 
manner to exogenous shocks and to credibly enforce the rules on which it is based. Cases 
in point are the BEPG which failed to stem the diverging competitiveness developments 
within the euro area (see Chart 6) and the SGP, which did not force Member States to 
bring national budgets “close to balance or in surplus”.  
 
Chart 6. Evolution of unit labour costs across the euro area 
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It could even be argued that EMU actually suffered a setback in ‘fair-weather times’. As 
an example, while the revised SGP became more wide-ranging, it allowed for much more 
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flexibility and discretion, thereby becoming de facto less binding. Similarly, the 2005 
mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy endorsed an approach involving more ‘national 
ownership’ and neglecting benchmarking and peer pressure (Ioannou et al 2010; 14). The 
Member States used this concept of national ownership to limit any interference from the 
European level.  
 
Another telling example of path dependency, resistance and institutional friction is to be 
found in the governance of financial markets in the euro area. In fact market integration 
outpaced institutional integration. Alexandre Lamfalussy, the former head of the European 
Monetary Institute, qualified financial governance as “suboptimal” (Lamfalussy 2004). 
This created institutional friction as EU financial integration stumbled upon what can be 
called a “financial trilemma”: there is an in-built incompatibility between financial 
integration, financial stability and independent national supervision (Schoenmaker and 
Osterloo 2007). Institutional friction comes also from the fact that “the home country 
supervisors’ mandate does not include co-responsibility for financial stability in partner 
countries but the host country authorities, whose mandate is to ensure financial stability, 
do not have authority for supervising financial institutions from partner countries unless 
they operate through independent subsidiaries” (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2010: 345).  
 
As long as banks remained in the national realm, national regulators had an informational 
competitive advantage and thus blocked any transfer of competence to the EU. But while 
the emergence of pan-European banks made this argument less stringent, there were no 
supervisory arrangements which would give more clout to the EU level. Instead, 
institutional dynamics of financial supervision followed rather the logic of 
decentralization to national regulators, harmonisation of EU legislation, the creation of a 
European Committee of Banking Supervisors (CEBS) to ensure consultation between 
national regulators and technical advice to the Commission (Quaglia 2010).  
 
All this demonstrates that the institutional choices made in Maastricht have largely 
determined the path of the institutional evolution of EMU over the first eight years. In fact, 
the Lisbon Treaty did not reform fundamentally EMU (see Frankal, Oleaga and Coussens, 
2007) despite the fact that, as the successor of the late Constitutional Treaty, it was supposed 
to address concerns over economic governance expressed in the Laeken Declaration of the 
European Council in 2001. The Lisbon Treaty is a prime example of incremental 
institutional evolution. 
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This lack of profound institutional change can be explained by the force of two 
‘reproduction mechanisms’ (Lindner 2003), namely the lack of interest in change by the 
dominating actors and – paradoxically - the ability of the institutional set-up to 
accommodate pressure for change through small institutional alterations at the margin.  
 
The former was exemplified during the negotiations of the new treaties – the late 
Constitutional Treaty and the now implemented Lisbon Treaty (Hodson 2009a: 520). 
First, Finance Ministers opposed any radical change in the institutional architecture of 
EMU, unwilling as they were to upgrade the Eurogroup to the full status of a Council 
formation and to give more power to the European Commission (Puetter 2007). Second, 
tensions between France and Germany over a potential political counterweight to the ECB 
slimmed down the chances for an overhaul of economic governance in the first decade of 
EMU. Finally, also the timing may have raised some hurdles: the Working Group on 
Economic Governance of the European Convention “met during a period of heightened 
tension over the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact” (Hodson 2009a: 520). In 
July 2003, the European Convention presented its draft Constitution. The 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) did so for the final draft in June 2004. Obviously, 
this overlaps with the vote to put the SGP “in abeyance” in November 2003 and the ruling 
of the ECJ in July 2004. In fact, “there was little appetite among the members of the 
European Convention’s Working Group on Economic Governance to become embroiled 
in the controversy over the Stability and Growth Pact by calling for radical reforms to 
EMU’s institutional architecture” (Hodson 2009a: 520). 
 
Most importantly, the relative stability of EMU over the first eight years can be explained 
by the ability of the institutional setting to accommodate pressure for change by small on-
path changes (as described in Section 3.1). A number of incremental changes occurred to 
address the increased economic and political interconnectedness among euro area 
economies, but they did not go far enough to fully cope with it and paradoxically 
contributed to the stickiness of the institutional setting. Not least given the favourable 
economic conditions, the consequences of the mismatch between the policy requirements 
and the institutional capabilities did not manifest themselves in “fair weather” times. 
 
The crisis time period, in contrast, may have proved to be a shot across the bows revealing 
the deficiencies of EMU’s institutional framework. In the next section the focus of our 
analysis will move from institutional change per se to how the institutional framework 
structured and thus, to a certain extent, conditioned the crisis response. 
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4. Weathering the storm: EMU during the crisis (2007-2010)  
 
The financial turmoil has been largely recognised by observers as a litmus test for EMU. 
For the first time since its launch, the ability of EMU to batten down the hatches and react 
swiftly in a coordinated way to external shocks has been stress-tested on a massive scale. 
This presented a whole new set of challenges to EMU and its institutional set-up. This 
section attempts to capture the dynamics of EMU between 2007 and 2010 by taking a 
micro-perspective and focusing more specifically on the respective role of institutions and 
of Member States’ interests in shaping the crisis response. The subsequent sections will 
successively analyse the response of EMU to the financial crisis (Section 4.1) and to the 
sovereign debt crisis (Section 4.2).  
 
4.1. Policy coordination initiatives during the financial crisis 
The situation in which the EU has found itself since the outbreak of the crisis has been 
characterised by numerous (positive and negative) spill-over effects from national policy 
actions in areas such as liquidity support, recapitalisation of banks and fiscal policy 
(Quaglia, Eastwood and Holmes 2009: 67). The EU has traditionally been based on a set 
of rules (e.g. competition policy), whose compliance is ensured by the Commission and 
the ECJ. However, the rule-based system in place at the beginning of the crisis was not 
tailored for such extraordinary circumstances. The coordination by the EU of national 
responses to the crisis could not revert to rules, and some discretionary action was thus 
required. This could have implied a severe risk of a vicious spiral of “beggar-thy-
neighbour policies” like in the 1930s 15 – which the EU has successfully mitigated.  
This is well illustrated by the Irish example (Glöckler 2009). Shortly after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the Irish government announced a guarantee that would “safeguard all 
deposits, covered bonds, senior debt and dated subordinated debt” (Irish Ministry of Finance 
2008) with six Irish financial institutions. This decision was aimed at avoiding bank runs 
and a meltdown in the domestic financial sector and was thus fully rational from an Irish 
political perspective. However, it ignored the potential “externalities” of this decision, 
notably the fact that Ireland, and the Irish financial system, are part of the euro area and EU 
financial market. If other EU countries had attempted to “maximize their utility” by 
announcing measures of that type, it would have led to a fragmentation of the integrated 
financial and money markets: savers would naturally have withdrawn their savings from 
                                                          
15 Involving, inter alia, unilateral devaluations and the reintroduction of import levies. 
Preliminary draft – Please do not quote 
 
 
Page 22 of 40 
banks in countries where these were not guaranteed by the state and channelled them to 
banks in countries where they were. Would this spiral of financial sector “beggar-thy-
neighbour” measures have escalated, the integrated financial market would have re-
fragmented and renationalised into individual national financial markets. The outcome 
would have been clearly sub-optimal from a pan-European perspective. The swift reaction 
of EU institutions contributed to remedying this problem – even though only partially. On 
7 October 2008, the ECOFIN Council committed to take all necessary measures to protect 
the deposits of individual savers (EU Council 2008). A week later, the European 
Commission (2008d) brought forward a proposal to promote convergence of deposit 
guarantee schemes. It aimed at avoiding competitive distortions inter alia by increasing the 
minimum coverage level, and was adopted in March 2009. Nevertheless, this revised 
directive was not without limitations since it set a minimum, not a maximum, for such 
schemes in the Member States. In addition, it did not regulate guarantees in respect of non-
deposit liabilities (Quaglia, Eastwood and Holmes 2009: 76). 
A number of similar initiatives have been taken at the EU-level to ensure that the design 
of national stabilisation measures to resolve the financial turmoil does not lead to negative 
spill-over effects and that a level-playing field is maintained across the EU (see ECB 
2010b). Those initiatives related mainly to a common agreement among euro area 
countries on guiding principles and common intentions for the design of national responses 
with a view to upholding the informal market. Specifically, the European Commission, in 
close cooperation with the ECB, provided guidance to Member States on the 
implementation of those principles, for instance with regard to approvals of State aid 
schemes and ad hoc rescue measures for banks (see European Commission 2008c), the 
modalities and pricing of recapitalisations of financial institutions (European Commission 
2008f and European Central Bank 2008c and 2008d); or the specific principles for bank 
asset support measures and the treatment of impaired assets (European Commission 2009a 
and European Central Bank 2009) 
These policy coordination measures have not been limited to the banking sector. The 
Commission also stepped in to sustain the real economy by adjusting its framework for 
state aid to support access to finance. Under this framework, state aid rules are applied “in 
a way that achieves maximum flexibility for tackling the crisis while maintaining a level 
playing field and avoiding undue restrictions of competition” (European Commission 
2009b). Moreover, in December 2008, the European Council agreed an EU-wide 
economic stimulus of around €200 billion. The so-called ‘European Economic Recovery 
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Plan’ (European Commission 2008e) was made up of budgetary expansion by Member 
States of €170 billion and EU funding in support of immediate action of €30 billion.  
 
However, a certain scepticism persists among observers whether this was a genuine EU 
response or whether it was not rather the mere coordination by the EU of national 
responses (Glöckler 2009). For example, with respect to fiscal policy, the principles and 
guidelines of the European Economic Recovery Plan were rather vague, leaving the 
magnitude and timing of fiscal impulses mainly to the discretion of national governments 
(Quaglia, Eastwood and Holmes 2009: 83). In the field of competition policy, the 
European Commission could not prevent that the rescue packages e.g. for banks and in the 
auto industry were to a large extent organised along national lines. Also in institutional 
terms, as former Commission President Jacques Delors critically argues, “when the crisis 
actually began, it seemed (…) to prove the intergovernmental method over the EU method 
(…) the fact that the initiative came from governments and not from the EU institutions 
will weigh heavily in the future” (Delors 2010: 17). Indeed, the measures of the Paris 
Declaration (see box 2) were very much driven by national governments. Some observers 
point out that the Commission did not play a central role in this initiative, though it 
provided support via its existing infrastructure for cooperation among governments.. In 
that sense, the fact that an EU umbrella could be opened upon the urging of the 
Commission as cover for the agreed set of measures had more to do with the coincidence 
of the EU presidency in the hands of an activist French government, rather than a genuine 
capacity of action of the supranational governance structures (Glöckler 2009).  
 
What do these examples of collective action show? Rational choice theory would have 
predicted, under the severe circumstances in which Member States found themselves, a 
myopic, protective, national-interest-first policy response, with little regard for the negative 
spill-overs to the other EU and euro area countries. However, there has been no meltdown of 
EMU. The EU/EMU framework has reacted in a pragmatic and flexible manner to the 
extraordinary conditions which it was faced with. One of the main reasons why the crisis has 
not deteriorated into a 1903s-style spiral of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies was the 
existence of supranational institutions able to shape Member States’ behaviours. Member 
States agreed to comply with some common minimum rules when trying to mitigate the 
effects of the crisis. Through the issuance of common guidelines, Union institutions thus did 
play a significant role in remedying the ‘collective action dilemma’.  
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Though bearing in mind some caveats, one can still argue that the EU’s decision-making 
processes functioned quite smoothly during the financial crisis. By contrast, the episode of 
the sovereign debt crisis exemplified how an institutional framework based on rules and 
without sufficient scope for discretion over joint action displayed deficiencies in 
managing diverging national interest and perspectives so as to deliver a timely, 
determined and ultimately market-calming policy response. 
 
4.2 The ad hoc response of EMU to the sovereign debt crisis 
While, in the early stages of the crisis, shocks came mainly from ‘outside’, in the form of 
common disturbances to the financial sector that affected all Member States, the focus of 
the crisis shifted early 2010 to shocks coming from ‘inside’. At stake were failings of the 
governments themselves whose adverse implications were magnified by the markets. A 
coordinated response proved much harder to come by. Euro area Member States were 
expected by financial markets, unless they allowed their common currency to be exposed 
to unprecedented stresses, to act in a way that had not been assumed in the EMU 
framework, i.e. to provide financial support to each other to ensure the financial and 
economic stability of the whole euro area. But even more than that: the very foundation of 
monetary union expressly excluded that Member States assume each others liabilities, via 
the “no bail-out” clause (Article 125 TFEU). This implied that the euro area had no 
contingency plan for providing financial assistance to one of its members (Greece). 
Instead, the euro area had to coordinate 16 different countries who shared no prior 
consensus on what balance should be struck between creating market impact, protecting 
taxpayers and limiting moral hazard.  
In this context, the euro area response resembled more of an ad hoc response rather than a 
structured process. Due to the shortcomings of the EMU framework, domestic political 
interests came to the forefront and figured prominently in official communication, with 
detrimental effects on the financial markets. This translated into negative feedback loops 
between markets and policy actions. Markets looked to euro area governments to provide 
a unified direction, and reacted violently when political processes failed to deliver or 
resulted in disorderly communication from European policy-makers. Indeed, empirical 
evidence shows a correlation between daily spreads for 10-year government debt and 
significant political events (Carmassi and Micossi 2010). Graph 7 suggests that specific 
events, accompanied by inconsistent statements of politicians at critical junctures, may 
have deepened the crisis by casting further doubt in markets about the ability of the euro 
area to coordinate itself.  
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Chart 7. Problematic interaction between politics and markets 
Yields on Greek 2-year sovereign bonds 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley Quarterly Short-Term Credit Market Update, 4th Quarter 2010 
 
Even the €110 billion package of bilateral loans to Greece of 2 May 201016 failed to re-
establish market confidence and was paradoxically followed by increased market volatility 
and soaring bond spreads. One answer could be that the ad hoc nature of the euro area’s 
crisis response led markets to continuously doubt its credibility, creating a self-fulfilling 
downward spiral. Concerns about fiscal sustainability even began to spread to larger euro 
area countries. Not until the far-reaching policy decisions of the weekend of 7-9 May 
2010 were euro area governments able to break this loop and get ahead of the curve. On 
this decisive weekend, the EU finally responded by creating two new crisis management 
instruments: the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). These two mechanisms did not breach the 
aforementioned non bail-out clause because Member States thereby did not assume 
liabilities but instead provided loans under strict conditionality.  
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On 9 May 2010, the ECOFIN Council adopted a Regulation (No 407/2010) setting up the 
EFSM. It allows the Commission to raise up to €60 billion on behalf of the EU for lending 
to EU Member States experiencing or being threatened with severe economic or financial 
disturbances. EFSM financial assistance is subject to strong policy conditionality and 
takes place in the context of joint EU-IMF programmes, on terms and conditions similar 
to those of IMF lending. The extension of the Regulation has to be reviewed every six 
months. Furthermore, euro area Member States, on an intergovernmental basis, 
established the EFSF as a limited liability company under Luxembourg law, with the 
purpose to provide loans to cover the financing needs of euro area Member States in 
difficulty, subject to strong policy conditionality in the context of joint euro area-IMF 
programmes. These loans are financed through the issuance of debt securities, guaranteed 
up to a total of €440 billion by euro area Member States on a pro rata basis (see chart 8). 
Finally, the IMF is expected to provide financing amounting to at least half as much as the 
euro area contribution to each programme, on terms and conditions in line with recent 
European programmes. 17 
 
Chart 8. How the EFSF works 
 
 
The euro area policy response to the sovereign debt crisis thus provides further evidence 
for the types of institutional change observed since 1999, namely layering. In fact, while it 
                                                                                                                                                                
16 In May 2010, euro area governments and the IMF decided, under stringent conditionality, to grant Greece a 
€110 billion loan, consisting of €80 billion of bilateral loans from euro area countries and an IMF contribution 
of €30 billion. 
17 For a more comprehensive overview, see also ECB (2010d). 
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is from a policy perspective a major innovation, the creation of the EFSM and EFSF 
amounts – in institutional terms – to the introduction of new layers, added on top of the 
existing set-up, and relying on already functioning infrastructures (EWG as Board of 
Directors of the EFSF, EIB to handle treasury services). This demonstrates that, even 
when subject to a severe crisis, EMU continues to evolve in an incremental way.  
 
Setting up the EFSF was instrumental in restoring market confidence, but it is only a 
temporary solution. A permanent crisis management framework would be preferable to 
relying on ad hoc arrangements, which – as was demonstrated by the Greek case – run the 
risk of creating uncertainty in markets and reinforcing volatility. Naturally, the precise 
design of any such permanent framework would need to minimise the moral hazard that is 
inherent in any ex ante financial assistance scheme (ECB 2010c).  
 
5. Taking stock and looking forward  
 
Looking at the first twelve years of existence of EMU through the lenses of new 
institutionalism, what lessons can be drawn? How can we explain the rapidly changing 
assessments of EMU outlined in the introduction? And what is the likely impact of the 
crisis on the institutional development of EMU in the coming years? The subsequent 
sections will address these two questions. 
 
5.1 Has EMU passed the test? 
Even though new institutionalism takes a broad definition of “institutions” as covering 
formal institutions and rules as well as informal practices, a more refined differentiation 
between the institutions as such and the system of rules and procedures helps explain and 
identify the strengths and shortcomings of the EMU institutional set-up. While institutions 
provided a flexible framework for interaction between the different parties involved, the 
implementation of the rule-based incentive system proved to be inadequate in view of the 
high level of economic interdependency within EMU.  
 
On the one hand, the crisis has demonstrated the remarkable flexibility and resilience of 
the EMU framework. As outlined in Section 2, it has been able to evolve gradually in 
“normal times” through the processes of layering and redirection without requiring any 
Treaty change. Much of the Lisbon Treaty merely codified changes that had been 
introduced earlier on in practice. Most significantly, when they became massively stress-
tested with the outburst of the crisis, EMU institutions have been able to react swiftly to 
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extraordinary circumstances. This has been made possible inter alia by an intensification 
of institutional relations within the existing set-up.  
 
Also noteworthy in times of crisis was the exemplary cooperation between EU co-
legislators. This is well illustrated by the extremely swift adoption of a revised regulation 
establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States’ 
balances of payments (EU Council 2009). It aimed at raising the ceiling for the 
outstanding amount of loans to be granted to Member States from EUR 25 billion to EUR 
50 billion.18 This revision was of critical importance given the severity of the crisis in 
certain non euro area Member States. In April-May 2009, the legislative procedure (which 
included the adoption of an opinion by the European Parliament and by the ECB) was 
completed within 40 days. While the EU machinery is often blamed for its slowness, this 
example demonstrated that the EU institutions are capable of reacting quickly and of 
cooperating with each other when conditions urgently require it.  
 
However, this flexibility and resilience were not sufficient to address the fundamental 
mismatch between the level of policy interconnectedness and the level of institutional 
development prevailing within EMU. While euro area economies have become more and 
more closely interlinked, the institutional set-up has proved to be insufficiently developed 
in the field of economic governance. To start off, the EU, as a “community of law” resting 
on the principle of “mutual sincere cooperation” between its institutions (Art. 13.2 TEU), 
was fundamentally ill-equipped to countenance the possibility of an outright defiance of 
common rules, e.g. in the form of persistent fraudulent accounting and intentionally 
defective statistics that violated agreed standards. Moreover, the existing governance 
framework did not provide euro area Member States the right incentives, be it sanctions or 
rewards, to internalise the constraints of monetary union. The fact that economic policy was 
predominantly a national responsibility militated in favour of “non-interference” in other 
countries’ economic policy decisions. This translated into insufficient peer pressure, 
reluctance to give early warnings or precise recommendations, and procedures – like the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure – which dragged on for many months. This was combined with 
a weakening of market discipline, as reflected in the low and converging levels of 
government bond yields over the first twelve years of the euro. As a result of these two 
factors, Member States did not take sufficiently into account the externalities of their 
economic policies (i.e. the implications for the rest of the euro area). In line with rational 
choice theory, national governments were rather focused on domestic concerns. In fact, this 
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phenomenon could be observed since the very creation of EMU. However, its concrete and 
dire consequences became apparent only with the outburst of the sovereign debt crisis.  
 
This helps to reconcile the sudden shifts in the assessment of EMU with its gradual 
institutional evolution (respectively outlined in Section 1 and 2). In its first decade of 
existence, EMU was largely praised, notwithstanding its weaknesses. Some – especially 
the ECB (2008a) – warned against the fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances, but policy 
makers, economic agents, and, most relevantly, financial markets chose to ignore. The 
institutional framework was thus largely considered as being ‘fit for purpose’. With the 
outburst of the crisis, the risks that had existed since the early days of EMU have abruptly 
materialised. Observers have then suddenly focused on the shortcomings of EMU, some 
even going as far as predicting its meltdown should no reform be undertaken (Münchau 
2010). One can conclude from these observations that, similarly to financial markets, the 
assessment of EMU is characterised by a certain degree of procyclicality – successively 
downplaying and overemphasising its weaknesses, depending on the cycle. 
The most topical question that arises from this stock-taking exercise is whether the crisis, 
which brought such important shortcomings to the fore, will spur the appropriate 
institutional reform.  
 
5.2. The impact of the crisis on EMU: will the crisis be ‘wasted’? 
It has been said that “a crisis is a terrible thing to waste”19. In a similar vein, expressions 
such as “critical juncture” or “window of opportunity” have flourished in 2010 in public 
pronouncements of European policy-makers. Empirically, one can observe a number of 
signs, both in the field of economic governance and of financial supervision, indicating 
that the crisis has provided a genuine reform impetus.  
 
On the one hand, the so-called ‘Van Rompuy Task Force’ was established in March 2010 
by the European Council. It was chaired by the President of the European Council and 
composed of representatives of the Member States, the rotating Presidency and the ECB. 
Its official mandate was to “present to the Council (…) the measures needed to reach the 
objective of an improved crisis resolution framework and better budgetary discipline, 
exploring all options [emphasis added] to reinforce the legal framework” (European 
Council 2010a). It recognised the need to take a broad view of governance that 
                                                                                                                                                                
18 This ceiling had been already raised from EUR 12 to EUR 25 billion in early December 2008. 
19 Paul Romer, November 2004 
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encompasses fiscal policy, competitiveness and crisis management. It delivered its report 
on 21 October 2010, while the Commission (2010 b-g) presented its legislative proposals 
on 29 September 2010 (see an overview of the main innovations in Table 2). 
 
Among the numerous proposals presented by Member States and EU institutions in the 
framework of the Van Rompuy Task Force, some were unconceivable in “normal times” 
as they touch the very core of national sovereignty. For example, Germany and France 
suggested in their joint proposal the suspension of voting rights for countries not 
complying with the Stability and Growth Pact (Lagarde and Schäuble 2010). Several 
Member States also proposed the creation of a Eurobond. These two proposals are rather 
far-reaching in terms of loss of national sovereignty. Before the outburst of the crisis, they 
could only be found in the academic realm, certainly not on the EU political agenda. The 
crisis has thus extended the boundaries of the public debate beyond what was politically 
conceivable under normal circumstances.  
 
Table 2. Main innovations of the Commission’s legislative proposals and the Van 
Rompuy Task Force Report 
 
 European Commission’s legislative proposals Van Rompuy Task Force Report 
Fiscal 
Surveillance 
- Notion of “prudent fiscal policy-making” 
- Operationalisation of debt criterion through 
the adoption of a numerical benchmark 
- Reverse voting mechanism for the 
imposition of sanctions 
- Graduated financial sanctions for euro area 
member states (interest-bearing deposit, non 
interest-bearing deposit, fines) 
 - Minimum requirements for national fiscal 
frameworks 
- Reputational and political 
sanctions: enhanced reporting 
requirements, surveillance 
missions, public report to the 
European Council 
- Measures to strengthen Eurostat 
- Set of non binding standards for 
national fiscal frameworks  
Macroeconomic 
surveillance 
- Alert mechanism through a scoreboard (set 
of indicators, alert thresholds) 
- Preventive surveillance based on discussions 
with Member States and in-depth reviews 
- Excessive Imbalance Procedure (involving 
financial sanctions for euro area member 
states) 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Another telling example of this impetus for change is the ongoing reform of the financial 
supervisory architecture. Any reform endeavour in this field has always been strongly 
resisted by national authorities. By exposing important failures in the Lamfalussy structures, 
the crisis has clearly accelerated their overhaul and is bringing about a new financial 
supervisory architecture, i.e. the European System of Financial Supervision (see Chart 9). 
The package agreed upon by the EU co-legislators in autumn 2010 foresees the creation of 
three European micro-supervisory Authorities (ESAs) – each of them being in charge of 
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overseeing a sector of the financial system (Banking, Insurance, Securities and Markets). 
The ESAs are responsible for developing technical standards with a view to a single EU 
rulebook and have power to ensure the consistent application of Union rules across national 
jurisdictions. In addition, a new body, i.e. the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), was 
created. The ESRB is responsible for macro-prudential oversight of the European financial 
system as a whole – an area which was clearly missing before and during the crisis. It 
monitors and assesses potential threats to financial stability and has the power to address 
warnings and recommendations to a national or European authority.  
 
Chart 9. The new design of the financial supervisory architecture 
 
 
All of this seems to indicate that the crisis will accelerate institutional development. Does 
that mean that the EU and the euro area are at the brink of moving towards a radically new 
governance framework for their economies and financial sectors, as demanded by some 
observers (De Grauwe 2010)? In fact, many institutionalists divide the flow of historical 
events into periods of continuity punctuated by critical junctures, i.e. moments when 
substantial institutional change takes places thereby creating a “branching point” from 
which historical development moves into a new path (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942). Does 
the crisis represent such a “branching point” and is EMU moving into a new path? 
 
Probably not. In all likelihood, a fundamental overhaul of the existing EMU set-up cannot 
be expected and the institutional changes to be anticipated will at best be of a rather 
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gradual nature. During the first decade of existence of EMU, the institutional framework 
has evolved gradually, subject to a certain path dependency, and institutions have proved 
to be sticky. The evidence in crisis response and since then seems to confirm that 
institutionalism will continue to be a valid theory to explore the dynamics of EMU in the 
years to come. In other words, the institutional framework will continue to evolve by the 
processes of layering and redirection.  
 
As regards economic policy coordination and surveillance, the Europe 2020 Strategy is a 
prime illustration of this trend: it mainly consists of streamlining and redirecting the 
Lisbon Strategy and its existing policy instruments. National Reform Programmes 
continue to play a key role under Europe 2020 similar to their role in the Lisbon Strategy. 
The Integrated Guidelines for Economic and Employment policies, an instrument already 
foreseen in Treaty, have been revised to reflect the new priorities of the Europe 2020 
Strategy. Their number has been reduced to 10, from 24 under the Lisbon Strategy.  
 
Chart 10. Governance of the Europe 2020 Strategy 
Fiscal 
surveillance
Macro-economic
surveillance
Thematic
coordination
Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines
EUROPE 2020 FIVE HEADLINE TARGETS
Stability and 
Growth Pact
National 
Reform
Programmes  
Stability and 
Convergence 
Programmes  
Commission’s Annual Growth Survey  
EU annual policy guidance and recommendations
EU flagship initiatives and levers
National level
EU level
 
 
As regards more specifically the debate on economic governance, it has become soon clear 
that, at least in the short-term, no new institution would be created, and no step change 
would occur as regards the repartition of competences between the EU and Member States. 
As an example, the European Council conclusions of 16-17 December 2010 “agreed on the 
text of a limited amendment to the Treaty on the establishment of a future permanent 
mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole” (emphasis added) 
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to be adopted by the simplified revision procedure (European Council 2010b). Using the 
typology of institutional change, one can argue that the reform of economic governance will 
be most likely dominated by the redirection of existing instruments. In fact, the six 
legislative proposals of the Commission do not conceive a governance framework 
completely ex novo, but rather rely on the existing SGP. On the fiscal side, the Commission 
proposes to revise existing Council regulations initially adopted in 199720, while the newly 
created framework for macroeconomic surveillance is clearly inspired by the SGP (e.g. 
preventive and corrective arm, Excessive Imbalance Procedure).  
 
A closer look at the financial supervisory reform also shows the incremental nature of the 
changes. The proposed legislation does not create the ESAs from scratch but upgrades the 
existing 3L3 committees by transforming them into authorities with legal personality and 
enhanced competences. As for the ESRB, it should be underlined that this new body will 
have no legally binding powers and that it could be seen as an umbrella organisation 
gathering existing institutions (mostly national central banks and national supervisors of 
the EU-27). This is once again an example of how the institutional architecture of EMU 
evolves by the process of layering. The existence of a legislative review clause confirms 
that the financial supervisory architecture has not reached its final shape and will be 
subject to further incremental changes. 
 
Institutionalism also provides interesting insights by arguing that gains from cooperation 
are the main determinant of institutional development (Hall and Taylor 1996: 945-946). 
Applying this assumption to the financial supervisory reform allows to understand why a 
‘big-bang’ approach – such as the creation of a single supervisory authority – cannot be 
expected. The crisis has certainly revealed the costs of insufficiently harmonised financial 
regulation and supervision and thereby demonstrated the benefits of more integrated 
structures. For instance, the severe difficulties encountered by the Irish banking sector – and 
consequently by the Irish government – exemplified the inadequacy of a purely national 
approach to crisis management and resolution. When a national banking system encounters 
difficulties, national taxpayers alone may not be able to absorb the shock. This may imply 
contagion effects and thus eventually requires a European response. As the Turner Review 
of the UK Financial Services Authority points out, 
 
                                                          
20 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies; Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 
7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure 
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“the current arrangements, combining branch passporting rights, home country 
supervision, and purely national deposit insurance, are not a sound basis for the 
future regulation and supervision of European cross-border retail banks (…) 
Sounder arrangements require either increased national powers, implying a less 
open single market, or a greater degree of European integration” (FSA 2009: 101).  
 
All in all, there seems to be a general consensus among EU institutions on the gains 
stemming from the “more Europe” option. At the same time, these benefits are associated 
with losses of national competences. Following a rational choice logic, Member States will 
agree to a deeper level of integration until the point where their marginal utility (i.e. gains 
from more integrated supervision) is outweighed by the marginal cost (i.e. loss of 
competences). This is well illustrated by the compromise over the financial supervisory 
reform, where the direct supervision of cross-border financial institutions by the ESAs 21 and 
the application of the so-called ‘safeguard clause’22 were among the most contentious issues. 
In these two cases, a significant loss of competences of national supervisory authorities and 
a limitation of national fiscal sovereignty were respectively at stake. As Member States are 
still reluctant to transfer too many competences to the EU level, the financial supervisory 
architecture could not be subject to any “revolutionary” change. This illustrates well the 
force of one ‘reproduction mechanism’, namely the lack of interest in change by dominating 
actors.  
 
These empirical observations are fully in line with one of the main predictions of the new 
institutionalist literature, namely that policy-makers cannot go for a “breakdown and 
replacement” single-handed reform because this would not be sustainable and would 
eventually lead to a reaction bringing back old institutions (Guardiancich 2009). Institutional 
reforms therefore have inbuilt bias towards incremental change, as the more sustainable and 
efficient form, rather than “clean slate approaches”. Even the most severe financial and 
economic crisis since the end of the Second World War is likely to verify this prediction. 
 
 
                                                          
21 The European Parliament was in favour of a supervisory arrangement according to which the European 
Supervisory Authority would “take over the supervision of financial institutions meeting the systemic risk 
criteria to the extent they could jeopardise the stability of the Union financial system, where a national 
authority has failed to exercise its powers” (European Parliament 2010: 12). Such a direct supervision has 
been so far opposed by the EU Council. 
22 The Commission’s proposal states under Article 23 that “the Authority shall ensure that no decision adopted 
under Articles 10 and 11 [in case of an emergency situation or of a disagreement between national authorities] 
impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States” (European Commission 2009c). The 
exact scope and modalities of application of this safeguard clause are subject to tough negotiations between 
the European Parliament and the Council. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
To sum up, the crisis will accelerate institutional development, but will do it only in a 
gradual way. Even when subject to a massive stress-test, EMU seems to follow the same 
logic of institutional change than in its first eight years. Despite the very different external 
economic conditions, this paper has identified at least one common feature between the two 
periods examined: no matter whether in ‘fair weather’ or in ‘stormy’ times EMU evolves by 
gradual on-path changes. However, this does not mean that the crisis will be ‘wasted’. 
  
First of all, one has to put the institutional evolution of EMU analysed throughout this 
paper into historical perspective. In view of the high-stakes experiment it represents, EMU 
is a very young endeavour and – by any historical standards – has been evolving rather 
swiftly. For example, in the US the necessity for a common central bank only led to action 
with the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Therefore, the importance of the changes observed 
since the creation of EMU, and in particular during the financial crisis, has to be assessed 
against the historical scale commensurate with such endeavours (i.e. decade-wise rather 
than year-wise) and should not be underestimated.  
 
Secondly, the fact that EMU will broadly remain on the same path decided in Maastricht 
is not negative as such. The decisive issue to bring EMU back to sustainable growth and 
fiscal discipline is to address the main shortcoming of the EMU framework so far, i.e. the 
internalisation of the EMU dimension into Member States’ rational choices. This can be 
achieved while remaining on the same path and without going for a “big-bang approach”. 
For example, the new supervisory framework will be successful if it succeeds in 
compelling its various components (especially the national supervisory authorities) to 
internalise the European dimension when exercising their prerogatives.  
 
In a similar vein, in the field of economic governance, in order to ensure real commitment 
from policy makers to “regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern” 
(Article 121 TFEU), the institutional framework must be enhanced to provide the right 
incentives and to ensure compliance. This should apply to both preventive and corrective 
arms of surveillance processes. Given the crucial importance of national fiscal 
frameworks, the EU could incentivise the adoption of national rules and/or institutions 
that encourage and enforce fiscal discipline. As regards the corrective arm, the idea of 
using the EU budget for sanctions (but only to the extent that it does not hurt individual 
entitlements - European Commission 2010) would force Member States which benefit 
from the EU budget to take into account the externalities of their fiscal decisions for the 
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rest of the euro area when calculating their ‘utility’. The design of any permanent crisis 
management framework should be governed by similar considerations. Non-compliance 
with conditionality should be met with sanctions, escalating to de facto loss of fiscal 
autonomy. This would ensure that the recourse to any crisis resolution mechanism would 
be sufficiently unattractive and would limit moral hazard. Financing the mechanism would 
also sharpen the incentives for all euro area countries to exercise effective peer pressure 
and surveillance to prevent crises. This would shape expectations of fiscally undisciplined 
governments about how other Member States are likely to behave in case of unsound 
fiscal policies and thereby shape their own strategic calculations.  
 
Such an approach would contribute to match the level of institutional development with 
the level of policy interconnectedness. The governance framework would better reflect the 
intensity of economic and financial interdependency within the EU and, in political terms, 
the reality of the euro area “Schicksalgemeinschaft” (Trichet 2010). 
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